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Abstract !!
The information technology and security stakeholders like CIOs, CISOs and CTOs in financial services 
organization are often asked to identify the risks with mobile computing channel for financial services that 
they support. They are also asked to come up with approaches for handling risks, define risk acceptance 
level and mitigate them. This requires them to articulate strategy for supporting a huge variety of mobile 
devices from various vendors with different operating systems and hardware platforms and at the same 
time stay within the accepted risk level. These articulations should be captured in information security 
policy document or other suitable document of financial services organization like banks, payment service 
provider, etc. While risks and mitigation approaches are available from multiple sources, the senior 
stakeholders may find it challenging to articulate the issues in a comprehensive manner for sharing with 
business owners and other technology stakeholders. This paper reviews the current research that 
addresses the issues mentioned above and articulates a strategy that the senior stakeholders may use in 
their organization. It is assumed that this type of comprehensive strategy guide for senior stakeholders is 
not readily available and CIOs, CISOs and CTOs would find this paper to be very useful.  !!!
Keywords:  Root-of-Trust, Device Fingerprinting, Web Application Firewall, Application IPDS, Information Security 
Policy Document, Secure Mobile Computing, Virtualization, Sandboxing !!!!
1. Introduction !!
Mobile banking and payments are new convenient schemes for customers to perform transactions, and 
are predicted to increase rapidly as the number of mobile phone users increases. The use of mobile 
devices, such as cellular phones, tablets, laptops and personal digital assistants to make payments and 
access financial services is becoming very common. !!
However there are risks associated with the usage and they must be taken into consideration. This paper 
reviews the threat model, risk assessment and discusses practical strategies which financial service 
providing organizations may consider for selection of supportable mobile devices and security constraints 
to be imposed on them. Mobile device based financial service providers face these questions and have to 
address them while formulating enterprise architecture, particularly the digitization of the processes.!!
Financial services support multi-channel architecture for access and mobile based access channel is 
becoming a very important one. And security is of paramount importance in financial services like 
banking, payment and the like. Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Chief Technology Officers (CTOs), Chief 
Information Security Officers (CISOs) and Information Security Architects at financial services 
organizations are often asked to articulate important considerations for mobile device based secure 
access to financial services they provide and strategy for selection of supporting mobile devices. This 
paper is expected to guide these senior stakeholders to make the right strategic decisions. While 
classification risks, threat modelling and mitigation approaches are available from multiple sources, the 
senior stakeholders often find it difficult to articulate policy for handling them in a comprehensive manner 
for sharing with business owners and other technology stakeholders.!!!
2. Review of Threat Model of Mobile Device Usage !!
There are so many hardware and software platforms under control of so many vendors in case of mobile 
devices and it makes managing security of the solution very difficult for an organization that needs to 
support a large number of devices, e.g., financial service providers. Furthermore, comprehensive security 
must take into account that of the application running on the operating system of the mobile device, the 
web services on the cloud or server, the integration with remote messaging services (e.g., Google Cloud 
Messaging, Apple iCloud) and the operating system, the hardware and firmware and the wireless network 
connection. Mobile devices use Bluetooth, NFC, IEEE 802.11 for short-range radio communication in 
Wireless LAN (WLAN) and Wi-Fi for data connection, mobile network operator provided data connection 
(GPRS or 2.5G, 3G, 4G, etc) and context-switched connection for voice and SMS and also USB port 
based physical connection and they too introduce vulnerabilities. !!
There are different classifications of threats and vulnerabilities associated with mobile devices.  NIST (SP 
800-124 Rev 1) [1] categorized the vulnerabilities into the following buckets: !!
• lack of physical security controls  - loss/theft of device and data !
• use of untrusted mobile devices - lack of root-of-trust features and jail-breaking and rooting which 
bypass built-in security controls !
• use of untrusted networks - public communications are susceptible to eavesdropping and man-in-
the-middle attacks, use of insecure configuration of protocol (e.g., weaker authentication and 
encryption algorithms in Wi-Fi ) and non-usage of VPN and private network!
• use of untrusted applications - using third-party insufficiently vetted applications from application 
stores!
• interaction with other systems - mobile devices may interact with other systems for data exchange 
(synchronization) and storage, resulting in data loss and injection of malware !
• use of untrusted content - automated processing of URL represented by QR code and obfuscated 
URL, without user intervention leading to using malicious website, non-deployment of secure web 
gateway !
• use of location service - location services enabled on mobile devices could increase risk of targeted 
attacks  !
!
OWASP [2] identified a set of risks and associated vulnerabilities resulting in the risk: !
• spoofing - improper session handling, social engineering, malicious QR code, untrusted NFC tag or 
peer, malicious application, weak authentication, weak authorization !
• tampering - modifying local data, carrier network breach, insecure Wi-Fi network !
• repudiation - missing device, toll fraud, malware, client-side injection !
• information disclosure - malware, lost device, app reverse engineering, backend service breach!
• elevation of privilege - rooted/jail-broken device, compromised device with rootkits, sandbox escape, 
compromised credentials, flawed authentication, weak authorization!
• denial of service - push notification flooding, crashing applications, excessive usage of API !!
A closer analysis will reveal that both classifications have many things in common and they may be used 
together. It may be highlighted that the risks are contributed by hardware, firmware, operating system, 
applications and also network.  !!!!
3. Risks Handling Approaches for Mobile Device Usage in Financial Transactions !!
Vulnerabilities and associated threats have some probability of occurrence and cause an impact on 
business. The latter is known as risk to business folks.  Risk may be addressed in four different ways: A 
solution may accept (do nothing), avoid (do not have process or operation that introduces risk), mitigate 
(put controls), or transfer (outsource or insure) risk. !!
Mitigate risk – activities with a high likelihood of occurring, but financial impact is small. The best 
response is to use management control systems to reduce the risk of potential loss.!
Avoid risk – activities with a high likelihood of loss and large financial impact. The best response is to 
avoid the activity. This is to say that we do not want to engage in such activity or support such associated 
features in our products or solutions.   !
Transfer risk – activities with low probability of occurring, but with a large financial impact. The best 
response is to transfer a portion or all of the risk to a third party by purchasing insurance, hedging, 
outsourcing, or entering into partnerships.!
Accept risk – if cost-benefit analysis determines the cost to mitigate risk is higher than cost to bear the 
risk, then the best response is to accept and continually monitor the risk.!!
For financial transactions which leverage mobile devices, mitigation is often the preferred strategy for 
handling the risk, with acceptance of residual risks. Henceforth, let us focus of discussion on feasible 
approaches for mitigation of important risks identified by the stakeholders. !!
Not articulating the risk acceptance often leads to issue in relationship between technology stakeholders 
and business owners. !!
In the following sections, let us discuss capability of mitigating some vulnerabilities which were identified 
in previous section, at the device hardware and firmware, operating system and application levels. This 
will help one determine suitability of a device for performing financial transaction safely. !!!
3.1 Untrusted Mobile Devices and Building Trust at Device Level !!
Root-of-trust (RoT) [3] is a collection of fundamental security primitives and capabilities needed to make 
mobile devices more secure and is often employed in workplace, i.e., enterprise environment, to support 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) scheme. However, the fundamental features of root-of-trust may be 
leveraged in a mobile device even when it is not used in enterprise environment. For example, financial 
service providers like banks may also leverage this to build separate trusted environment, with the help of 
RoT [29]. !
Fundamentally speaking, when a device is powered on, a hardware or firmware based root-of-trust 
component measures BIOS of the device from integrity perspective. If the measurements meet 
expectations, BIOS is executed and booting starts. If the measurements do not match expectations, 
impacted bad module is rolled back to last known good copy and only then BIOS is executed and booting 
starts.  !
Root-of-trust has been implemented in Apple iPhone, Windows Mobile and Samsung’s Android 
smartphones with Knox components. In fact, Blackberry smartphones which once enjoyed high adoption 
in enterprise space because of higher security standards, lost to competition from iPhones, Windows 
Mobile and Samsung Knox based smartphones, once they built root-of-trust and other security 
capabilities in the devices that they manufactured. !!
Root-of-trust along with secure booting goes a long way in preventing malware injection. It may be 
pointed out that one of the biggest risks in mobile financial computing is interception of user inputs by 
malware and sensitive information like account numbers, passwords, PINs, etc may be stolen by malware 
and transmitted to the command-and-control center operated by criminals.  !!
Many mobile devices, particularly those that are personally owned, are not necessarily trustworthy. Most 
currently distributed mobile devices lack the root-of-trust features (e.g., trusted platform module or TPM) 
that are increasingly being built into laptops and other types of hosts. There is also frequent jail-breaking 
and rooting of mobile devices, which means that the built-in restrictions on operating system have been 
bypassed and this renders the device less secure. !!
However, penetration of mobile devices with RoT feature is low and may take a few years to pick up. !!!
3.2 Risk Mitigation Approaches and Comparison of Devices in the Market!!
3.2.1 Sandboxing !!
Payment solution provider should assume that all phones are untrusted unless it has properly secured 
them before user access and monitors them continuously. There is a technical solution approach for 
achieving degrees of trust without using root-of-trust component, such as running the financial 
applications in a secure, isolated sandbox or container on the mobile device. !!
A sandbox (or container) is a security mechanism for separating running programs on mobile device and 
it relies on isolating code and the impact that code can have on runtime environment of mobile device. An 
abstraction layer is thus provided so that one application cannot step on toes of another application or 
corrupt the operating system. Typically it goes beyond simple application abstraction and includes 
encryption for data-at-rest and data-in-motion, with enhanced policy control that goes above and beyond 
the standard application level control. Secure containers separate financial application data and 
processing from personal data on the mobile device and prevent critical data from leaking out to 
unauthorized individuals. This is done by encrypting the data on the mobile device and providing 
additional data security features, such as copy-paste data loss prevention. A secure container often 
enables companies to perform a “remote-wipe” of enterprise data controlled by the sandbox. !!
Sandboxing is not governed by a widely accepted specification and may be classified in the following 
categories [14, 18]. !!
Bare metal sandboxing requires a hypervisor that typically lives at the firmware level. Above this firmware-
based hypervisor, there is one or more virtualized operating systems which are completely sandboxed 
from one another. This is the most secure approach, but requires significant work by device 
manufacturers and the technology did not see any significant traction in consumer smartphone and tablet 
space. !!
Second category of sandboxing runs on top of an existing operating system such as Windows Mobile or 
Android. Device manufacturers need not do significant work to support this type of sandboxing and it 
usually requires some small change in the operating system and no modification at the firmware level is 
needed. The downside is consumption of more resources by the “host” operating system, which runs one 
or more virtual (or guest) operating systems on top. Even for this one too, industry did not see significant 
adoption. !!
The third category of sandboxing is concerned with application level isolation where a standard 
application, which uses the native OS environment and API’s, is used to provide a sandboxed 
environment for other selected applications and data, and introduces additional security controls like 
advanced policy control, encryption, digital signature, etc. This category of sandboxing is currently very 
important for the mobile industry since there are no standards for the other two. This category is perhaps 
the best way to provide sandboxing, given the current state of adoption of mobile device technologies. 
Adoption of other two categories of sandboxing would probably take a few years.!!
Application level sandboxing can be broken down into the following sub-categories - content wrapper, 
workspace wrapper and application wrapper.  !!!
Content wrapper is focused on providing a secure container for enterprise documents. Many variants of 
content wrappers are becoming popular and are often directly aimed at stemming the document-sharing 
problem. !!
Workspace wrapper is aimed at providing a full work space environment for enterprises, including email, 
calendar, secure browsing, document editing, etc. Some workspace wrapping sandboxes are now 
allowing organizations to embed their own home-grown and enterprise applications inside the sandbox, 
ensuring that there is one common entry point to access any enterprise application or data. !!
Application wrapper introduces additional security layer, usually in the form of a software development kit 
or API that developers can integrate with their application and not have to worry about implementing their 
own data-at-rest  and data-in-motion encryption. Typically this technology provides additional policy 
control mechanisms which allow wrapped application to be individually wiped out thru enterprise Mobile 
Device Management system without touching the rest of the mobile device. From the perspective of 
information disclosure by malware in financial services applications, application wrapper would be most 
relevant. !!
A container software is installed remotely by a trusted 3rd-party on such mobile device as a one-time 
activity, with concurrence of the user. !!
The service administration team working for service providers can set a policy to encrypt data outside and 
inside the sandbox or container. !!
The sandboxing, among other things, typically relies on authentication and authorization (access control) 
of the mobile device by network access control (NAC) layer [15]. When a mobile device connects to a 
computer network, it is not permitted to access anything unless it complies with a business defined policy 
including anti-virus protection level, system update level and configuration. While the computer or the 
mobile device is being checked by a pre-installed software agent, it can only access resources that can 
remediate (resolve or update) any issues. Once the policy is met, the computer is able to access network 
resources, within the policies defined within the NAC system. NAC is mainly used for endpoint health 
checks and also Role Based Access. Access to the network will be given according to profile of the 
person or the mobile device and the results of a posture/health check. NAC solutions allow network 
operators to define policies, such as the types of mobile devices or roles of users allowed to access areas 
of the network, and enforce them in switches, routers, firewalls, etc. Where conventional IP networks 
enforce access policies in terms of IP addresses, NAC environments attempt to do so based 
on authenticated user or device identities, at least for user end-stations such as laptops and desktop 
computers.!!
Combination of Mobile Device Management and NAC techniques would help secure the system by 
enforcing identity validation, access control and preventing information disclosure. !!
Samsung Knox [16] enabled mobile devices, Blackberry10, Windows Mobile smartphones, iPhones, etc 
leverage sandboxing and root-of-trust. Most of these devices are FIPS 140-2 [8] certified (often at level 
1). They have secure booting, integrity checks and trusted execution environment of some kind and they 
can create a separate secure container or sandbox. !!!!
3.2.2 Connected Small Form-Factor Physical Token!!
The token be used not just user authentication, but also for transaction integrity and non-repudiation 
(through PKI) on untrusted mobile devices. This however impacts user experience because mandating 
carrying a physical token is usually considered unfriendly. !!
Connected tokens are tokens that must be physically connected to the computer or mobile device with 
which the user is authenticating. Tokens in this category automatically transmit the authentication 
information to the client computer once a physical connection is made, eliminating the need for the user 
to manually enter the authentication information. However, in order to use a connected token, the 
appropriate input device must be installed. The most common types of physical tokens are smart 
cards and USB tokens, which require a smart card reader and a USB port respectively. !!
Smart cards are designed to protect the information they contain [4]. Tamper resistance techniques are 
used to protect the contents of the chip embedded on the card. Because standard credit card-size smart 
cards require a reader can somehow interface with the mobile device, it is not useful for most mobile 
devices. These days many mobile devices are supporting USB port and hence USB Smartcard is a 
practical portable and multi-platform strong user authentication solution for most mobile devices not 
equipped with root-of-trust. !!
Smart-card-based USB tokens which contain a smart card chip inside provide the functionality of both 
USB tokens and smart cards. Besides authentication of mobile device, authentication, i.e., validation of 
identity, of the user of the device is needed. !!!
3.2.3 Soft Token and SMS based OTP !!
SMS and soft token based OTP solutions [5, 6] are not purely out-of-band because they still use context-
switched 2G/3G/4G connection and data connection, respectively, on the mobile device and this can be 
intercepted by malware. Hence this approach is less secure than hardware token based solution which 
does not use any of the connections mentioned above and hence cannot be intercepted by malware. Soft 
token and SMS based OTPs are often used because of convenience. !!
!
3.2.4 Device Fingerprinting !
 !
A user device is associated with a dynamic trust score [10, 11, 12, 13] that is calculated based on various 
activities and information associated with the mobile device including the configurations. The computation 
could use parameters of the device, such as device type, registered device location, the last time the 
device has been accessed, device phone number, device ID, etc and activities the device engages in, 
such as value of transactions, value of denied requests, value of approved requests, location of requests, 
etc. Based on a transaction request from the user device, the trust score and a network reputation score 
may be used to determine an overall trust score associated with the transaction request.  !!
Device fingerprinting can help uniquely identify the device and distinguish malicious and non-malicious 
ones. Mobile device attributes like operating system and browser type, etc may have subtle differences 
among used devices, e.g., browser plug-ins and other attributes which may be less obvious. !!
Device fingerprinting approach may detect malicious devices regardless of credit card, name or IP 
address used. It is valuable because fraudsters use stolen identities and proxies to bypass IP address 
blacklists and IP geolocation filtering mechanisms employed by many financial service providers or their 
services partners. As a fraud prevention tool, real value of device fingerprinting lies in the ability to 
transparently correlate device attributes and anomalies at the browser, packet, protocol and OS levels in 
order to detect fraud attempts. This can work even if the mobile device is not equipped with root-of-trust 
(RoT) security features and most devices in the market are not having RoT. !!!
Financial application developers may integrate with third-party device fingerprinting solution and SDK on 
client side programming and employs integration with solution provider accumulated SaaS based device 
score related services on the server side. !!!!
3.2.5 Geo-location Check  !!
Checks may be introduced to stop a transaction originating from mobile device in a specific geo-location. 
Solutions available in the industry typically combine geo-location and device fingerprinting checks. !!!!
3.2.6 Data-in-motion Protection !!
VPN for connection between the mobile device and the enterprise is a commonly deployed mechanism 
for data protection at channel level. !!
When VPN cannot be used to cover authentication and encryption for the session across applications, 
SSL/TLS for communication channel with Diffie-Hellman key exchange [17] may be considered at 
application level. This mechanism may be used in application to exchange data over a secure channel. !!
Message level encryption may be applied to ensure further protection of data-in-motion. !
Derived unique key per transaction (DUKPT) key management [7] with FIPS 140-2 Level 3  [8] certified 
crypto-module, e.g., Secure Element, may be used on client side, for protection of data-in-motion. DUKPT 
is a key management technique and is commonly used for POS terminals [9], typically for 3DES 
encryption algorithm. Most mobile devices do not support software-only DUKPT because it is not secure 
and requires a capable hardware component to be inserted to the mobile device thru USB port or audio 
jack. !
!
For laptop TPM (trusted platform module) may be leveraged for such scheme. For mobile phone and 
tablet, dongle may be attached from outside or Secure Element with adequately hardened and certified 
(SIM, micro-SD or embedded) may be used.  !!!
3.2.7 Application Level Intrusion Detection and Web Application Firewall for Mobile Security !!
Most mobile interactions with the server use HTTP and HTTPS protocols and the applications may 
leverage intrinsic security controls built into the web applications, web application firewall (WAF)  and 
application level intrusion detection and prevention techniques [27]. Miscellaneous other controls have 
been employed [24, 25, 26]. Use of WAF and intrinsic security controls is very common and PCI DSS and 
PA-DSS [28] and other compliances also enforce deployment of such controls. !!!
4. Mobile Device Selection - Choices before CIOs, CTOs and CISOs in Financial 
Service Organizations !!
Can all mobile devices be supported for delivery of financial services in a secure way? Should the high-
end devices only be supported, thereby excluding a large number of mobile device owners? Which 
security controls, out of those reviewed in the paper, are considered absolutely necessary by the financial 
services organization’s information management team? Which mobile devices, along with third-party 
solutions in deployment architecture, are capable of supporting those security controls? Which risks may 
be accepted? Which risks should be mitigated? Should one consider different transaction limit for devices 
with different degree of security controls? How would one identify device security posture? Should 
financial services organization invest in mobile device management (MDM) [19]  and/or secure web 
gateways (SWGs) [20] solutions for protecting customers (not employees)? These are some of the 
common questions that need to be addressed by the office of information officer and security architects. 
Often financial services organization may not have a well-defined strategy to address them. !!
MDMs and SWGs are typically employed by enterprise to manage devices used by the employees and 
not for non-enterprise users. Hence these solutions are typically not employed by financial services firms 
to secure mobile financial transaction by customers. Often CIOs are not sure if they should adopt these 
solutions. !!
Device fingerprinting, geo-location checks and related security features are often by third-party hosted 
solution providers [21, 22, 23]. Since trusted mobile computing with RoT features, is not going to get wide 
acceptance in next 4-5 years, device fingerprint and associated checks are likely get wide acceptance for 
supporting wide range of mobile devices in financial services industry. Therefore device fingerprinting is 
going to stay as a dominant anti-fraud measure in mobile based access to financial services in future. !!
Mobile platforms iOS, RIM/Blackberry, Java, Android, Windows Mobile and access channels like SMS, 
USSD, Mobile Web and Rich Client may have to be supported by the financial services organization. All 
channels and devices will not have similar security posture. For example, encryption of data between the 
mobile device and the BTS (tower) in GSM network thru USSD may be cracked easily and transaction 
limit for this cannel cannot be high. Most devices are not equipped with RoT and we may use device 
fingerprinting instead. But the latter may not be cheap to implement. Here defining risk acceptance level 
in organization information security policy and getting approval from business owner, would be important. !!
Formal risk handling and threat modelling for supporting various mobile devices in financial services 
industry may be developed by the office of CIOs, CISOs and Security Architects and the strategic 
approaches highlighted by the authors may be leveraged. They may capture them in information security 
policy document or other artifacts. !
!!
5. Conclusions !!
Mobile platforms iOS, RIM/Blackberry, Java, Android, Windows Mobile and access modes SMS, Mobile 
Web and Rich Client may be supported within defined risk acceptance level. And security parameter like 
transaction limit, authentication level, authorization level and confidentiality of the operation may be set 
appropriately, thru a formal, business-owned risk management practice.  !!
This paper shows approaches for handling risks with mobile computing channel for financial services that 
are supported. It also shows approaches for defining risk acceptance level and mitigating them. And 
thereby it helps to articulate strategy for supporting a huge variety of mobile devices from various vendors 
with different operating systems and hardware platforms and at the same time stay within the accepted 
risk level. Often these articulations are captured in information security policy document of financial 
services organization, but many organizations do not have a formalized approach. Though risks and 
mitigation approaches are often available from multiple sources, senior technology stakeholders would 
often find it challenging to articulate the issues in a comprehensive manner to business owners of the 
organization and other technology stakeholders. This paper reviews the current research that addresses 
the issues mentioned above and articulates a strategy that the senior stakeholders may leverage in their 
organization. It is assumed that this type of comprehensive strategy guide for senior stakeholders is not 
readily available and CIOs, CISOs and CTOs would find this paper to be very useful.  !!!
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